SSI Treatment of In-Kind Income-the One-Third Reduction Rule by Goodell, Andrew
Cornell Law Review
Volume 65
Issue 5 June 1980 Article 11
SSI Treatment of In-Kind Income-the One-Third
Reduction Rule
Andrew Goodell
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please
contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Andrew Goodell, SSI Treatment of In-Kind Income-the One-Third Reduction Rule, 65 Cornell L. Rev. 909 (1980)
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol65/iss5/11
NOTES
SSI TREATMENT OF IN-KIND INCOME-
THE ONE-THIRD REDUCTION RULE
The Federal Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program
provides financial assistance to the elderly, the blind, and the
permanently and totally disabled. Effective January 1, 1974, this
program, administered by the Social Security Administration
(SSA), replaced a system of state-administered assistance programs
that were partially funded by federal grants.1 Congress designed
the new program to ensure a minimum income for be-
neficiaries.2  The SSI statute defines income comprehensively 3 to
I Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 301, 86 Stat. 1329, 1465
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1385 (1976 & Supp. 11 1978)), as amended by Social Security
Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-171, § 6, 91 Stat. 1353, 1355 (1977). Kennedy,
Thomas & Schmulowitz, Conversions to Supplemental Security Income From State Assistance: A
Program Records Study, Soc. SEC. BULL., JUNE 1975,'at 17. See A. ABRAHAM & D. KOPELMAN,
FEDERAL SOCIAL SECURITY 182-83 (1979).
2 See Cardinale v. Mathews, 399 F. Supp. 1163, 1164 (D.D.C. 1975) (dicta); S. REP.
No. 1230, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 383-84 (1972); SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, DEP'T OF
HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, SOCIAL SECURITY HANDBOOK 352-53 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as HANDBOOK].
3 42 U.S.C. § 1382a (1976) provides:
(a) For purposes of this subchapter, income means both earned income and
unearned income; and-
(1) earned income means only-
(A) wages ...
(B) net earnings from self-employment ... and
(2) unearned income means all other income, including-
(A) support and maintenance furnished in cash or kind; except that (i) in
the case of any individual (and his eligible spouse, if any) living in another
person's household and receiving support and maintenance in kind from such
person, the dollar amounts otherwise applicable to such individual (and spouse)
as specified in subsections (a) and (b) of section 1382 of this title shall be re-
duced by 33 1/3 percent in lieu of including such support and maintenance in
the unearned income of such individual (and spouse) as otherwise required by
this subparagraph, (ii) in the case of any individual or his eligible spouse who
resides in a nonprofit retirement home or similar nonprofit institution, support
and maintenance shall not be included to the extent that it is furnished to such
individual or such spouse without such institution receiving payment therefor
(unless such institution has expressly undertaken an obligation to furnish full
support and maintenance to such individual or spouse without any current or
future payment therefor) or payment therefor is made by another nonprofit
organization, and (iii) support and maintenance shall not be included and the
provisions of clause (i) shall not be applicable in the case of any individual (and
his eligible spouse, if any) [who was living in another's household before a na-
tional disaster caused his relocation]. . ..
(B) any payments received as an annuity, pension, retirement, or disability
benefit, including veterans' compensation and pensions, workmen's compensa-
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include support and maintenance furnished in cash or in kind.'
This Note examines the difficulties with statutory provisions and
implementing regulations governing in-kind support and mainte-
nance, and evaluates criticisms of the program and proposals for
improvement.
A. Statutory Provisions
The SSA reduces an individual's benefit by the amount of his
outside income 5-including the actual value of all support and
tion payments, old-age, survivors, and disability insurance benefits, railroad re-
tirement, annuities and pensions, and unemployment insurance benefits;
(C) prizes and awards;
(D) the proceeds of any life insurance policy to the extent that they exceed
the amount expended by the beneficiary for purposes of the insured individu-
al's last illness and burial or $1,500, whichever is less;
(E) gifts (cash or otherwise), support and alimony payments, and inheri-
tances; and
(F) rents, dividends, interest, and royalties.
See STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 95th CONG., 1st SEss. REPORT ON THE SUPPLE-
MENTAL SECURITY INCOME PROGRAM 72 (Comm. Print 1977) [hereinafter cited as STAFF
REPORT].
' 42 U.S.C. § 1382a(a)(2)(A) (1976). In-kind support and maintenance income occurs
frequently and is difficult to measure. In 1975, HEW estimated that the special provisions
on support and maintenance in kind affected 400,000 individuals. Supplemental Security In-
come Program: Hearings Before Subcomm. on Public Assistance of the House Comm. on Ways and
Means, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 239 (1975) [hereinafter cited as 1975 Hearings] (statement of
Rep. Richard H. Fulton). The American Association of Retired Persons and the National
Retired Teachers Association estimated that these provisions affect 20% of old-age recip-
ients. Id. at 265 (statement of John B. Martin). Measuring in-kind income presents practical
problems of valuation. 1975 Hearings, supra at 10 (statement of James B. Cardwell, Com-
missioner, Social Security Administration); S. REP. No. 1230, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 388
(1972); H. R. REP. No. 231, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 152 (1971), reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 4989, 5138.
42 U.S.C. § 1382 (b) (1976) provides:
(1) The benefit under this subchapter for an individual who does not have
an eligible spouse shall be payable at the rate of $1,752 ... reduced by the
amount of income, not excluded pursuant to [42 U.S.C. § 1382a(b) (1976)], of
such individual.
(2) The benefit under this subchapter for an individual who has an eligi-
ble spouse shall be payable at the rate of $2,628 ... reduced by the amount of
income, not excluded pursuant to [42 U.S.C. § 1382a(b)], of such individual
and spouse.
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1382f (1976), the benefit levels are adjusted periodically to reflect cost-
of-living increases. As of July 1979, benefits were $2,498.40 for a single individual and
$3,747.60 for an individual with an eligible spouse. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, CLAIMS MANUAL § 13128 (1979).
The term "benefit level" refers to the annual rate of payment specified in the statute
for a single recipient or a recipient with an eligible spouse. The term "income level" refers
to the amount of the individual's income recognized under the statute and subtracted from
his benefit level. 42 U.S.C. § 1382a (b) (1976 & Supp. 11 1978). Benefits are computed by
subtracting an individual's income level from his benefit level. For example, as of July
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maintenance furnished in kind-unless the individual falls within
one of three exceptions. 6 An important exception applies to an
individual who lives in another's household and receives in-kind
support and maintenance from that person. 7  For a qualifying
beneficiary, the statute reduces the applicable benefit level "by
33 1/3 percent in lieu of including such support and maintenance
in the unearned income of such individual (and spouse)."8  This
provision is known as the one-third reduction rule.
Congress designed the one-third reduction rule to simplify
program administration 9 by eliminating the practical problems of
determining the actual value of in-kind support and maintenance
provided to SSI applicants living in the household of a friend or
relative. 0  The rule provides an irrebuttable presumption that if
an individual receives any such in-kind income, it is worth one-
third of the applicable benefit level. 1 Because actual value of
this income is irrelevant, cash payments by the SSI recipient to the
person with whom he lives do not reduce the presumed value of
the support and maintenance he receives. 12
1979, the benefit level for an individual without a spouse was $208.20 per month. If he
had an income level of $108 per month, his SSI benefits would be $100.20 per month
($208.20 -108.00). See HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 355.
6 See 42 U.S.C. § 1382a(a)(2) (1976).
1 42 U.S.C. § 1382a (a)(2)(A)(i) (1976). See note 3 supra. The two other major excep-
tions are: (1) in-kind income in the form of support and maintenance provided by certain
nonprofit retirement homes under certain conditions, id. § 1382a (a)(2)(A)(ii), and (2) gov-
ernment emergency housing in national disaster areas, id. § 1382a(a)(2)(A)(iii). In addition,
$240 of unearned income per year ($20 per month) is excluded. Id. § 1382a (b)(2)(A).
8 Id. § 1382a(a)(2)(A)(i). In the example in note 5 supra, the one-third reduction rule
would reduce the individual's benefit level from $208.20 to $138.80 per month. When the
SSA subtracted his income level of $108 from this reduced benefit level, the individual
would receive an SSI payment of $30.80 per month instead of $138.80 per month.
9 STAFF REPORT, supra note 3, at 73.
10 See note 4 supra and text accompanying note 67 infra.
n STAFF REPORT, supra note 3, at 73.
t The SSA recognizes a payment by the individual toward his support and mainte-
nance only to determine whether the one-third reduction rule applies. See text accompany-
ing notes 14-15 and 20-22 infra. If the value of the support and maintenance exceeds the
payment, the individual receives in-kind income in excess of his payment and the one-third
reduction rule applies. The SSA, however, does not reduce the amount of the one-third
reduction by the amount of the individual's payment.
Congress intended the one-third reduction rule to apply whether or not recipients
make any payment toward their support and maintenance. The House and the Senate
Reports state: "Under the bill, the value of room and board, regardless of whether any
payment was made for room and board, would be assumed to be equal to one-third of the
applicable benefit standard." S. REP. No. 1230, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 388 (1972); H.R. REP.
No. 231, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 152 (1971). The Social Security regulations implement this
congressional intent. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.1125(B)(1) (1979).
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B. The Regulations
The one-third reduction rule applies when four conditions
are satisfied: (1) the SSI applicant receives in-kind income, (2) in
the form of support and maintenance, (3) provided in another
person's household, (4) by that person.1 3
1. In-Kind Income
The one-third reduction rule applies only if the individual
receives in-kind support and maintenance income. This require-.
ment poses substantial administrative difficulties when the indi-
vidual makes payments toward his support and maintenance. If
an individual asserts that his payment equals the full value of
support and maintenance received, the SSA must determine the
value, the very determination that the one-third reduction rule
was designed to eliminate. 14 If he pays less than the value of his
support and maintenance, he receives net in-kind support and
maintenance, and the rule applies.' 5 Until 1978, the regulations
did not prescribe a method for valuing support and maintenance
to determine net income. 16 The SSA's operating policy, however,
valued such support and maintenance by the "community rate"
approach. 17 Under this approach, if an individual paid an
amount equal to the costs of living in his community's commercial
facilities, the SSA assumed he was paying full value for his sup-
port and maintenance and did not apply the one-third reduction
rule."8 The community rate approach proved inflexible and in-
equitable. The SSA later conceded that "[t]he community rate
concept ... bore no necessary relationship to the current market
value of the support and maintenance an individual actually re-
ceived. Moreover, this concept was open to varied interpretations
and thus . . . it could not be applied with any consistency on a
national basis." 19
In an attempt to resolve these problems, the SSA issued reg-
ulations in 1978 that replaced the community rate approach with
a valuation based on the individual's pro rata share of household
42 U.S.C. § 1382a(a)(2)(A)(i) (1976).
'4 See notes 9-10 and accompanying text supra.
42 U.S.C. § 1382a(a)(2)(A)(i) (1976). See notes 20-22 infra.
' See 40 Fed. Reg. 48,937, 48,938-39 (1975); 38 Fed. Reg. 27,406, 27,407-08 (1973).
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expenses. 20  Under the new scheme, the SSA first divides the
total household expenses by the number of persons in the house-
hold, regardless of their age or actual consumption. 21  If the in-
dividual pays his pro rata share within five dollars, the one-third
reduction rule does not apply.22 Because the pro rata share is
based on the actual costs of running the household, the share
is usually equal to or below the fair market value of the in-kind
support and maintenance. The new regulations thus avoid the
necessity of determining actual market value, while assuring that
the individual subject to the one-third reduction rule receives net
in-kind income. 23
2. In the Form of Support and Maintenance
Although the statute does not define the term "support and
maintenance, ' 24 the pre-1978 regulations defined the term as
20 Id. at 29,284 (codified at 20 C.F.R. § 416.1125(b)(3)(iv) (1979)). "An individual is not
considered to be living in another person's household when ... [tihe eligible individual is
paying at least a pro rata share of the average monthly total household operating expenses
as described in paragraph (b)(5) of this section." Id.
21 20 C.F.R § 416.1125(b) 5.
Total household operating expenses means the average of total monthly ex-
penditures for food, rent or mortgage payments, real property taxes, heating
fuel, gas, electricity, water, sewer services and garbage collection services. The
term refers only to amounts actually expended by the household for the pur-
poses specified in this paragraph ... ; it does not include the value of any
in-kind support and maintenance provided by a source external to the house-
hold. A pro rata share of total household operating expenses is determined by
dividing the monthly average of these expenses by the number of persons in
the household regardless of age or individual consumption of any of the items.
Payment of an amount which is within $5 of the monthly pro rata share is
considered to meet the pro rata requirement. A pro rata is generally deter-
mined by averaging the specified household expenses for the 12-month period
prior to determination.
Id. The specified items are "the only household expenses to be considered" in determining
the pro rata share. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND
WELFARE, CLAIMS MANUAL § 12236.3B1 (1978).
22 20 C.F.R. § 416.1125(b)(5) (1979). If an individual pays for in-kind support and
maintenance by providing services, the pro rata share approach does not, of course, apply
since this would be earned income. See id. § 404.419(c).
23 Some commentators have criticized the pro rata share approach because the recip-
ient bears the burden of rebutting the presumption that he receives in-kind income. See,
e.g., 1975 Hearings, supra note 4, at 92 (statement of Wilbur Schmidt, Chairman, National
Council of State Public Welfare Administrators); id. at 276 (statement of Philip Mastin,
member, Michigan Legislature, for National Conference of State Legislatures). The 'indi-
vidual may be unable to rebut the presumption. He must show that he currently pays his
pro rata share, but in some cases he can pay nothing until he receives SSI funds. Id. at 276.
Despite these inequities, the use of this rebuttable presumption may withstand judicial re-
view. See note 85 infra. These inequities could be resolved through appropriate statutory
modifications. See notes 80-83 & 88-94 and accompanying text infra.
24 See 42 U.S.C. § 1382a(a)(2)(A)(i) (1976).
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"room and board and . . . other incidentals, such as clothing,
necessary to an individual's normal sustenance. ' 25  The present
regulations, however, expressly include only "food, clothing, and
shelter, or any portion of any or all of such items." 2 6 This defini-
tion is inadequate in several respects. It fails to specify how much
food, clothing, and shelter an individual must receive to qualify as
a recipient of support and maintenance. Although provision of a
single meal clearly does not constitute support and maintenance,
the imprecision of this definition invites uncertainty- Moreover,
the new definition omits items traditionally considered to fall
within the term. For example, the current regulation appears to
exclude medical supplies-a substantial expense for many aged,
blind or disabled individuals -from "support and mainte-
nance." 27  However, neither the regulation nor the SSA's discus-
sion of the regulation indicate that the agency considered the
1978 change significant, so this omission may have been uninten-
tional.
Under a literal reading of this new definition, if an indi-
vidual receives food, shelter and medical supplies from the person
with whom he lives, only the food and shelter would qualify for
the one-third reduction. Because medical supplies would fall out-
side the definition of support and maintenance, they would con-
stitute additional unearned income that would further reduce the
individual's benefit level.28
Another interpretational problem arises when an individual's
payment toward his support and maintenance covers the value of
food but not shelter, or vice versa. Because this individual receives
in-kind income in the form of free shelter, the one-third reduc-
tion rule would seem to apply. The SSA, however, requires that
the individual receive both food and shelter to trigger the rule's
25 40 Fed. Reg. 48,937, 48,938 (1975). The SSA issued regulations in 1973, 1975, and
1978. The 1973 and 1975 regulations defined support and maintenance similarly. See 38
Fed. Reg. 27,406, 27,407 (1973) ("Support and maintenance may generally be defined as
room and board, and would also include other incidentals necessary to an individual's
normal sustenance.").
26 20 C.F.R. § 416.1125(a) (1979).
27 Since neither the regulation nor the SSA's discussion of the regulation indicate that
the agency tonsidered the 1978 change significant, this omission may have been uninten-
tional. See 43 Fed. Reg. 29,281, 29,282-83 (1978). In actual practice, medical supplies are
included in the term support and maintenance.
28 The statute requires all unearned income to be included in the computation of the
individual's benefit level unless the income falls within one of three exceptions. See 42
U.S.C. § 138 2a(2) (1976) and notes 6-8 and accompanying text supra.
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application. 29 This interpretation appears to conflict with the
regulation providing that the "one-third reduction ... applies re-
gardless of any payment the individual . . : may make toward the
support and maintenance. ' 30  To determine- whether an indi-
vidual receives both food and shelter and is thus subject to the
one-third reduction, the SSA must recognize any payment he
makes toward his support. 3' Moreover, the SSA is forced to
value the in-kind food or shelter.
The SSA avoided this conflict by creating a rebuttable pre-
sumption that an individual living in another person's household
receives both support and maintenance. 32  If the individual
proves that he pays for food or receives food from someone other
than the person with whom he lives, he can escape the statutory
one-third reduction rule. 33 The regulations nevertheless treat his
29 The one-third reduction rule does not apply when an individual receives "in-kind
support and maintenance from [the person with whom he lives] in the form of food only or
shelter only, but not both." 20 C.F.R. § 416.1125(c)(1) (1979) (emphasis added). See Califano
v. Heinol, 576 F.2d 112 (7th Cir. 1978); 43 Fed. Reg. 29,281, 29,282 (1978).
30 20 C.F.R. § 416.1125(b)(1) (1979).
31 The SSA could avoid this apparent inconsistency by interpreting the regulation re-
quiring disregard of payments to apply only when those payments are less than the value
of either food or shelter. If the payment exceeded the value of either food or shelter, the
individual would not receive both support and maintenance and the one-third reduction
rule would not apply. This approach, however, would force the SSA to determine the
value of the food and shelter for every SSI applicant-the very process the one-third
reduction was designed to avoid. See notes 9-10 and accompanying text supra. See also So-
CIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, SOCIAL SECURITY RULINGS ON FEDERAL OLD-AGE, SUR-
VIVORS, DISABILITY, HEALTH INSURANCE, SUPPLEMENTAL SECURITY INCOME, AND BLACK
LUNG BENEFITS 137 (1977) (Ruling No. 77-30) (recipient held to receive both support and
maintenance and thus fall within scope of one-third reduction rule although he bought
own clothes and paid $25 per month toward room and board).
32 When an eligible individual ... lives in another person's household ... he or
she will be presumed to be receiving in-kind support and maintenance in the
form of both food and shelter from the person in whose household he or she
lives, and the one-third reduction will apply unless the presumption is rebut-
ted ....
20 C.F.R. § 416.1125(b)(4) (1979).
33 Applicability of the one-third reduction may be rebutted by showing that an
eligible individual ... [d]oes not receive both food and shelter from the person
in whose household he or she lives. An individual who purchases (i.e., pays
for) his own food, or who receives food from someone other than the house-
holder is not receiving in-kind support and maintenance [as required by the
presumption of 20 C.F.R. § 416.1125(b)(4)].
Id. § 416.1125(b)(6)(iii). The individual must establish that his contribution "is specifically
for food or shelter as opposed to an unrestricted contribution to the pooled income of the
household." SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, DEP'T of HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE,
CLAIMS MANUAL § 12236.4B (1978).
The rebuttal regulation promotes administrative simplicity because the individual-
not the SSA-bears the burden of establishing the value of the food or shelter for which
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net in-kind income as unearned income, valued at one-third of his
SSI benefit, unless the individual can prove that its actual value is
less than the presumed one-third valuation. 34  If the actual value
of his net in-kind ,support or maintenance exceeds one-third of
his benefit level, the SSA ignores such excess in computing his
benefits. This result violates the statutory requirement that all un-
earned income be included in computing an individual's benefit,35
because the SSA computes the one-third valuation by using ben-
efit levels far below current living costs.3 6
3. Provided in Another Person's Household
The statutory requirement that in-kind income be provided
"in another person's household" to trigger the one-third reduction
he pays. Thus, the SSA need review only cases in which recipients challenge the presump-
tion.
3" 20 C.F.R. § 416.1125(c)(1), (d) (1979).
In Kimmes v. Califano, 472 F. Supp. 474 (D. Colo. 1979), appeal docketed, No. 79-1961
(10th Cir. Aug. 31, 1979), a district court implicitly rejected the regulations' market value
approach. The case involved a woman who lived alone in a mobile home owned by her
daughter. Although the woman paid all expenses associated with the trailer, the SSA de-
termined that she received in-kind income measured by the difference between her rental
costs and the trailer's market rental value. The SSA's approach accorded with its current
and prior regulations, both of which state that "[ulnless otherwise specified ... , the value
of in-kind support and maintenance refers to its current market value." 20 C.F.R.
416.1125(a) (1979); 40 Fed. Reg. 48,937, 48,938 (1975).
While recognizing that the "Social Security Administration's regulations are valid and
generally consistent with the Social Security Act," 472 F. Supp. at 475, the court ignored
those regulations'by rejecting the market value approach. 472 F. Supp. at 476. The court
noted, "[T]he central issue here is not whether in-kind income is countable or whether it
should be valued in one way or another, but whether plaintiff in fact received in-kind
income at all." Id. Although one cannot determine whether the woman received in-kind
income unless one first determines how in-kind income is measured, the court concluded:
"The law is clear that income, in-kind or otherwise, must be 'actually available' to the wel-
fare recipient in order for it to be counted against his or her eligibility or level of benefits."
Id. To support this proposition, the court cited two cases, Von Lare v. Hurley, 421 U.S.
338 (1975), and Shea v. Vialpando, 416 U.S. 251 (1975), that used a federal supremacy
rationale to invalidate state welfare regulations that conflicted with federal statutes and
regulations on Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). Because both SSI and
AFDC are federal programs, the supremacy rationale does not apply in Kimmes. The court
also cited Green v. Barnes, 485 F.2d 242 (10th Cir. 1973), and Wilczynski v. Harder, 323
F. Supp. 509 (D. Conn. 1971), which held that welfare agencies could consider only actu-
ally available resources in determining eligibility. The SSI program, however, would not
count as income the types of resources involved in these cases.
35 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1382 (b), 1382a (1976). The statute defines unearned income as "all
other income, including ... support and maintenance furnished in cash or in kind." Id. §
1382a(a)(2)(A) (emphasis added). If the SSA were to assign less than full value to in-kind
support and maintenance, some income would be excluded in violation of the statute.
6 For example, as of July 1979, the benefit level for an eligible unmarried individual
was $208.20 per month. Application of the one-third rule would reduce his maximum SSI
benefit by $69.40, an amount clearly less than the actual value of food or shelter received.
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rule 37 also raises challenging problems. The pre-1978 regulations
provided no guidance for determining whether an individual was
living in the household of another. 38 As an operating policy, the
SSA concluded that an individual lived in another's household un-
less the individual contributed to household expenses and partici-
pated in household decisions. 39 This policy unfairly applied the
one-third reduction rule to aged and mentally retarded SSI ben-
eficiaries who paid their pro-rata share of household expenses
but did not participate in household decisions.4"
In 1978, the Social Security Administration replaced this
operating policy with comprehensive regulations. 41  The regula-
tions presume that an adult individual lives in another person's
household when someone other than the individual's spouse,
minor child, or "essential person" lives in the house. 42  To rebut
this presumption, the individual must show (1) that he or his
spouse "has an ownership or life estate interest in the home," 43 or
(2) that he or his spouse "is liable to the landlord for payment of
any portion of the rental charges, 44 or (3) that he is living in an
exempt noninstitutional substitute home care situation,43 or (4)
that he "is paying at least a pro rata share of the average monthly
total household operating expenses. 46
37 42 U.S.C. § 1382a(a)(A)(i) (1976).
3 See 40 Fed. Reg. 38,938 (1975) (proposed 20 C.F.R. § 416.1135(b)(3)) and 38 Fed.
Reg. 27,408 (1973) (proposed 20 C.F.R. § 416.1125(a)) ("'Another person's household re-
fers to the household of a private individual."). See also 43 Fed. Reg. 29,281 (1978) (discus-
sion of prior operating policy for determining "another's household.").
3' See 43 Fed. Reg. 29,281, 29,282-83 (1978).
40 Id. at 29,282.
41 Id.
42 20 C.F.R §§ 416.1125(b)(2), 416.1190 (1979). If the eligible individual is a minor
living only with his parents, he does not live in "another's household." Id. §§
416.1125(b)(2)(iii), 416.1185(b).
43 Id. § 416.1125(b)(3)(i).
4 Id. § 416.1125(b)(3)(ii).
45 Id. § 416.1125(b)(3)(iii).
46 Id. § 416.1125(b)(3)(iv), (b)(5). The House Ways and Means Committee supported
the pro rata share approach:
Testimony from representatives of the Administration indicated that their pres-
ent policy is not to apply the "one-third reduction" when an individual pays his
full pro rata share of the household's expenses. The Committee wishes to
reemphasize its approval of this policy by stating its intention that any SSI
recipient living in the household of another who contributes his pro rata share
toward household expenses should not be subject to the one-third reduction by
reason of his living arrangements.
H.R. REP. No. 1201, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1976).
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The most dramatic change in the regulations is the extension
of the one-third reduction rule to individuals receiving support
and maintenance in their own households. Under the current
regulations, the SSA presumes that the value of in-kind support
and maintenance provided in one's own household equals one-
third of one's applicable benefit level. 17 The individual can rebut
this presumption by showing that the current market value of
such support and maintenance, less any payment he makes, is less
than the presumed value. 4 8
By eliminating the practical significance of the distinction be-
tween living in one's own household and living in another's
household, the regulations promote administrative simplicity. The
extension of the one-third valuation, however, lacks statutory
basis. The SSA acknowledged that this regulation "relates to situa-
tions in which an individual living in a household receives support
or maintenance, or both support and maintenance, but the statutory
requirements for a one-third reduction in the payment standard for living
in the household of another does not apply." 49 The statute, however,
clearly requires that in-kind income be assessed at full value if the
statutory requirements for one-third reduction are not met. 50 By
restricting the value of in-kind support and maintenance provided
to an individual in his own home to one-third of his benefit level,
the SSA prevents reduction of his benefit by all unearned income
worth more than the presumed one-third value.
4. By That Person
The one-third reduction rule applies only when the person
in whose household the SSI recipient lives provides in-kind in-
come in the form of support and maintenance. 51 Until 1978, this
requirement often caused inequities. If an individual received
support and maintenance from a person in the household and
also from someone outside the household, the statute required the
SSA to apply the one-third reduction rule and deduct the value of
the in-kind income received from the outsider.52 Yet if the indi-
47 20 C.F.R. § 416.1125(c)(4), (d)(2) (1979).
48 Id. § 416.1125(d) (1979).
49 40 Fed. Reg. 48,937, 48,938 (1975) (discussion of proposed 1975 regulations) (em-
phasis added).
50 See note 35 and accompanying text supra.
51 42 U.S.C. § 1382a(a)(2)(A)(i) (1976).
5' See id. at § 1382a(a)(2)(A), 1382(b) (1976).
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vidual received the same amount of in-kind benefits solely from
the person in whose household he lived, SSA would apply only
the one-third reduction rule. The identity of the person providing
the support and maintenance thus significantly affected the
amount of SSI benefits that an individual received.
To remedy this inequity, the SSA adopted regulations pro-
viding that when the one-third reduction rule applies, "any addi-
tional in-kind support and maintenance an eligible individual (or
couple) receives is not counted as income regardless of the
source." 53  This regulation exceeds statutory authority by permit-
ting the SSA to disregard this unearned income when computing
an individual's benefit.
C. Criticisms of the One-Third Reduction Rule
Although the SSA has attempted to resolve the major prob-
lems of administering the one-third reduction rule, the rule itself
remains subject to criticism.
1. Constitutional Problems
The one-third reduction rule may not withstand constitu-
tional attack. In Vlandis v. Kline, 5 4 the Supreme Court observed
that "[s]tatutes creating permanent irrebuttable presumptions
have long been disfavored under the Due Process [Clause] of the
Fifth [Amendment]." 55 The Court in Vlandis held that an ir-
rebuttable presumption is unconstitutional "when that presump-
tion is not necessarily or universally true in fact, and when the
State has reasonable alternative means of making the crucial de-
termination." 56 The irrebuttable presumption underlying the
53 20 C.F.R. § 416.1125(b)(1) (1979).
54 412 U.S. 441 (1973).
55 Id. at 446 (1973). The Court affirmed a lower court order enjoining the University
of Connecticut from enforcing a state statute's irrebuttable presumption of continuing
nonresidency for students who were residents of other states when they applied for admis-
sion. The Court held that the presumption violated the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 643 (1974) (ir-
rebuttable presumption that women four or five months pregnant are incapacitated from
teaching held unconstitutional); United States Dep't of Agric. v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508, 514
(1973) (irrebuttable presumption of lack of need based on dependency status for federal
income tax purposes held unconstitutional); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 649 (1972)
(irrebuttable presumption that unwed fathers are unfit parents invalidated).
56 412 U.S. at 452. The Court applies a rational basis test when evaluating irrebuttable
presumptions in social welfare programs. Otherwise, the doctrine disfavoring irrebuttable
presumptions could become "a virtual engine of destruction for countless legislative judg-
ments." Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 772 (1975). In Weinberger, the Court upheld the
1980] 919
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:909
one-third reduction rule is clearly not "necessarily or universally
true in fact" since the actual value of the in-kind income will equal
its presumed value merely by coincidence. Moreover, complex
regulations used to determine whether the irrebuttable presump-
tion applies undercut the practical justification for the irrebuttable
presumption. 57  The irrebuttable presumption is not crucial to
Social Security provisions that denied benefits to all widows and children whose relation-
ship to the deceased existed for less than nine months before he died. Quoting Flemming
v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 611 (1960), the Court said:
[Wihen we deal with a withholding of a noncontractual benefit under a social
welfare program such as [Social Security], we must recognize that the Due
Process Clause can be thought to interpose a bar only if the statute manifests a
patently arbitrary classification, utterly lacking in rational justification.
422 U.S. at 768. The Weinberger Court concluded:
There is thus no basis for our requiring individualized determinations when
Congress can rationally conclude not only that generalized rules are appro-
priate to its purposes and concerns, but also that the difficulties of individual
determinations outweigh the marginal increments in the precise effectuation of
congressional concern which they might be expected to produce.
Id. at 785. In a more recent decision, the Supreme Court found a rational basis on which
to uphold an SSI provision that terminated benefits for any month that the recipient spent
outside the United States. Califano v. Aznavorian, 439 U.S. 170, 174 (1978). The Court
noted that "[s]ocial welfare legislation, by its very nature,, involves drawing lines among
categories of people, lines that necessarily are sometimes arbitrary. This Court has consist-
ently upheld the constitutionality of such classifications in federal welfare legislation where
a rational basis existed for Congress's choice." Id. See also Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S.
471, 485 (1970).
The prevalence of the rational basis standard of review, which usually guarantees sur-
vival of governmental classifications, fails to quiet doubts about the constitutionality of the
one-third rule's irrebuttable presumption. Some courts have used the rational basis test to
defeat SSI classifications. See, e.g., Termini v. Califano, 464 F. Supp. 797, 801-02 (S.D.N.Y.
1979) (New York State SSI supplementation program's definition of "living with others,"
which embraced SSI recipients living with their minor children, held "patently irrational"
and unconstitutional). In addition, one court used a higher standard of review to invali-
date, on equal protection grounds, statutory provisions denying SSI to persons in public
mental hospitals. The court found that mentally disabled SSI recipients possessed some
indicia of a suspect class and thus qualified for the intermediate standard of review.
Sterling v. Harris, 478 F. Supp. 1046, 1050-53 (N.D. Del. 1979). An equal protection chal-
lenge, which attacks the classification created by the irrebuttable presumption, implicates a
higher standard of review than a due process challenge.
Continued use of the irrebuttable presumption in the one-third reduction rule may be
unwise. As one state legislator has observed:
The single instance in which SSI attempts to adjust its grant to the needs
of the individual, the one-third reduction of benefits for those classified as liv-
ing in the household of another, is not based on a realistic distinction and
seems to result in truly capricious reduction in the SSI grants of some individu-
als. . . . [T]he flat one-third reduction seems arbitrary at best.
1975 Hearings, supra note 4, at 276 (comments of Philip Mastin, member, Michigan Legisla-
ture, for National Conference of State Legislatures).
57 The regulations' complexity stems from the difficulty of determining when the one-
third reduction rule applies. One state legislator commented, "As an exercise in futility, I
encourage you to read the regulations that are supposed to tell you who gets the reduced
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the smooth operation of the SSI program; a rebuttable presump-
tion could serve the same function. 58
2. Disincentive to Outside Sources of Assistance
The one-third reduction rule discourages families and
friends from both aiding a blind, disabled, or aged SSI recipient
or taking him into their home.51 If the family's in-kind assistance
triggers the rule, that family may actually reduce the recipient's
standard of living unless the value of the contribution exceeds
one-third of the recipient's benefits.6" Many families of SSI recip-
ients cannot afford such a commitment.
1/3 and who doesn't." 1975 Hearings, supra note 4, at 674 (statement of California State
Senator George R. Moscone). The regulations have since been amended and are now more
complex. Compare 40 Fed. Reg. 48,938-39 (1975) with 20 C.F.R. § 416.1125 (1979). See also
notes 28-34 & 37-48 and accompanying text supra.
51 A rebuttable presumption adopted for administrative convenience would satisfy the
rational basis test. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 767-68 (1975). The Supreme
Court recently affirmed the strong presumption of constitutionality given to social welfare
legislation. See Califano v. Aznavorian, 439 U.S. 170, 174-75, 178 (1978). The Court has
upheld the constitutionality of a given welfare provision "[s]o long as its judgments are
rational, and not invidious." Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 546 (1972).
The SSA currently employs a rebuttable presumption for regulations on in-kind sup-
port and maintenance that fall outside the terms of the one-third reduction rule. See notes
34-35 and 46-48 and accompanying text supra.
59 Carroll Kowal, Chairperson of the Housing Committee of the New York Chapter
of the National Association of Social Workers testified: "The system of penalizing families
who are trying to take care of their disabled members or their elderly members of the
family is very unfortunate, and unfair." 1975 Hearings, supra note 4, at 323. Congresswo-
man Bella S. Abzug stated: "By allowing less than the full one-third reduction in some
cases as this [proposed bill] does, we might encourage certain kinds of companioned living
arrangements." Id. at 463.
60 When the family's in-kind contribution triggers the irrebuttable presumption that
the contribution's value equals one-third of the benefit level, the support must equal the
amount of the reduction to maintain the SSI recipient's standard of living. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1382a(a)(2)(A)(i) (1976). If the donated support is worth less than the reduction, the
recipient's standard of living will decline. If, however, the recipient lives in his own house-
hold or receives only food or shelter, he may use a rebuttable presumption to prove that
the in-kind support and maintenance received is worth less than one-third of his benefit
level. See notes 32-35 & 47-48 supra. In such a case, the SSA will reduce his benefit by the
market value of the contribution. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.1125(d) (1979) and text accompany-
ing note 34 supra. But if his family attempts to cover this reduction with additional in-kind
support, the SSA will further reduce his benefit, dollar-for-dollar, until the family in-kind
contribution totals one-third of his benefit level. Id. The SSA then disregards additional
family contributions. Id. at § 416.1125(b)(1). Thus, families' efforts to improve SSI recip-
ients' standards of living are "fruitless ... unless the contributors alone [can] support
them at a much higher level than SSI benefits" by giving in-kind support and maintenance
worth more than the one-third reduction. 1975 Hearings, supra note 4, at 728 (statement of
Sen. Robert Taft, Jr.).
The Supplemental Security Income program, which was intended to assist the
elderly, the disabled, and the blind, prohibits additional assistance from outside
sources by deducting such income from the SSI recipient's potential benefits.
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
The rule may also encourage the institutionalization of recip-
ients who require costly equipment or drugs. Application of the
one-third reduction rule to such a recipient may reduce his total
available income from SSI and outside sources below the amount
needed to sustain him at home, thus forcing him to enter an in-
stitution where government pays all his costs. 61 Besides frustrat-
ing families and friends and increasing government's costs, 62
institutionalization upsets the individual by removing him from
familiar surroundings and companions.
3. Penalty to Recipient
The one-third reduction rule penalizes an SS1 beneficiary
who receives in-kind support and maintenance income that is
worth less than its presumed value. Such an individual re-
ceives lower net benefits than does a person receiving in-kind in-
come of comparable value who falls outside the rule's scope, be-
cause the latter's benefit shrinks only by the actual value of his
in-kind income. s3 This inequitable treatment can occur in a variety
of circumstances. The individual's support and maintenance may
depend on his contributing partial payment when he resides with
friends or relatives who cannot or will not pay the full cost of
support and maintenance. Often an individual needs the compan-
ionship or general assistance available in a household but wishes
to avoid institutionalization.64 Out of personal pride the indi-
This is particularly cruel when an elderly, disabled, or blind person's own im-
mediate family wishes to assist the SSI recipient to rise over a bare subsistence
standard of living.
Id. at 451 (statement of Rep. Edward I. Koch).
61 Carroll Kowal, Chairperson of the Housing Committee of the New York Chapter of
the National Association of Social Workers stated: "[The one-third reduction rule] serves as
an incentive for families to institutionalize, rather than keep at home, SSI recipients." Id. at
328. Jack Gruenenfelder, Chairman of the Governmental Affairs Committee of the Na-
tional Association for Retarded Citizens, stated: "[The rule] has acted as a disincentive to
families to keep their retarded family member at home." Id. at 353.
62 Irving Engelmen, Staff Member of the American Public Welfare Association, tes-
tified: "[The one-third reduction rule] obviously tends to impair the degree to which aged
persons are acceptable in their own homes and tends to force them into these infinitely
more expensive institutional surroundings." Id. at 139.
'3 An individual who lives "in another person's household," rather than in his lown
household, is,subject to the one-third reduction rule. 42 U.S.C. § 1382a(a)(2)(A) (1976), 20
C.F.R. § 416.1125(b)(3), (c)(4) (1979).
" Because SSI beneficiaries must be either aged, blind, or disabled, they often reside
in others' households where care and companionship are available; although they may re-
ceive only minimal support and maintenance, they are subject to the full one-third reduc-
tion. This result is ironic because Congress aimed the SSI program specifically at poor
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vidual may desire to contribute toward his own support. Regard-
less of any offsetting payment by the individual, the value of the
in-kind support and maintenance may fall below its presumed
value because of poor quality. The present SSI program fails to
recognize these discrepancies in value, and, as a result, penalizes
these SSI recipients. Further, because the SSA disregards all par-
tial payments made by recipients covered by the one-third rule, an
individual who makes a significant partial payment receives the
same reduction as an individual who makes no payment what-
soever. An individual who pays more than one-third of his appli-
cable benefit level toward his support and maintenance will be sub-
ject to the one-third reduction rule unless he can prove that he is
paying his pro-rata share of expenses.65
4. Potential Abuse of SSI Program
If the one-third reduction rule applies, the SSA disregards
any in-kind income worth more than one-third the benefit level.
Consequently, the SSA treats an individual who receives expensive
in-kind support exactly the same as an individual who struggles to
survive on SSI benefits and minimal in-kind support. An indi-
vidual receiving abundant in-kind support from wealthy and
generous friends and relatives may qualify for SSI benefits even
though the program was designed to meet basic subsistence ex-
penses. 66
D. Proposals To Improve SSI Treatment Of In-Kind Income
Legislators have advanced numerous proposals to improve
SSI treatment of in-kind income. Solutions range from full valua-
people, who are unlikely to have wealthy families capable of providing substantial support.
See note 83 and accompanying text supra.
65 See notes 20-22 and accompanying text supra.
[S]ome State administrators did not believe and do not now believe that the
phrase "and receiving support and maintenance in-kind" would be interpreted
in such a way that it would result in a one-third reduction even for the indi-
vidual who is making a contribution, to the household in which he lives, of at
least as much as one-third of the benefit amount.
1975 Hearings, supra note 4, at 138 (statement of Wilbur J. Schmidt, chairman, National
Council of State Public Welfare Administrators (American Public Welfare Association)).
66 The low SSI benefits available, however, limit the rewards of such abuse. As of July
1976, the maximum benefit for an individual subject to the one-third reduction rule was
$138.80 per month. See note 9 and accompanying text supra.
Any cash income, earned or unearned, that the well-supported SSI beneficiary receives
will also be deducted from his SSI benefits. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1382a(1), 1382(b) (1976). Cf
42 U.S.C. § 1382a(b) (1976 & Supp. I 1978) (excluding certain amounts from income).
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tion of in-kind income to complete exemption of such income in
computing benefits.
1. Full Valuation
One possible solution to the problems of the one-third reduc-
tion rule is to eliminate any special treatment of in-kind income
and, instead, reduce benefits by the actual value of the support
and maintenance received. In theory, this proposal provides the
most equitable approach. By accounting for disparities in the
value of support and maintenance and in any offsetting payments,
it would eliminate penalties under the present system. In practice,
however, significant inequities would persist. In 1975, James
Cardwell, commissioner of the SSA, argued that "determinations
of in kind income are especially difficult and prove troublesome
for both the administrators and beneficiaries, and inevitably result
in inequities in spite of complicated attempts to establish a value
for such income."' 67  Under the current system, inequities arise
from a refusal to determine the value of in-kind income in certain
situations. Under a full valuation approach, they would arise from
the SSA's inability to determine value accurately and consistently
throughout the system.
Even if the SSA were able to value in-kind income, this
proposal would create major administrative problems. It would
require dramatic increases in SSA staff and support facilities to
determine the value of support and maintenance in individual
cases. Despite this expansion, the inherent difficulty of making
such determinations would delay SSI application processing. Ad-
ditional appeals would result, further straining the appeal pro-
cess. 68
Finally, the full valuation method would increase the present
disincentives to family assistance for SSI recipients. Because the
SSA would deduct the full value of the in-kind assistance from the
recipient's SSI benefits, private contributors could not increase the
17 1975 Hearings, supra note 4, at 10 (statement of James Cardwell, Commissioner, So-
cial Security Administration).
68 See SUBCOMM. ON SOCIAL SECURITY OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 96TH
CONG., IST SESS., SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES: SURVEY AND ISSUE PAPER
21 (Comm. Print 1979); SUBCOMM. ON SOCIAL SECURITY OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND
MEANS, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., DISABILITY ADJUDICATION STRUCTURE 24-27 (Table I)
(Comm. Print 1978): BUREAU OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRA-
TION, BHA FACT SHEET FOR FISCAL YEAR 1977, BHA Pub. No. 039 (1978).
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standard of living of an SSI beneficiary unless they first paid the
total amount of SSI benefits received by the individual.
2. Partial Exemption
Some legislators have suggested that the SSA should exclude
donated cash or in-kind support and maintenance worth less than
a specified dollar amount when computing the recipient's income
level. 69
This bill would encourage members of the immediate family to
supplement the frugal SSI benefit, thus enabling the ben-
eficiary to rise above a less than bare minimum subsistence
level. [A] $200 a month limitation [on the amount disregarded]
... provides enough flexibility to make a meaningful contribu-
tion to all individuals without permitting excesses. Most con-
tributions will be considerably less. The legislation will also
eliminate the need for subterfuges to disguise cash contribu-
tions as inkind payments, thus enhancing respect for law and
the dignity of all involved.70
Because an individual receiving up to $200 in cash or in-kind
donations would receive the same SSI benefit as a more needy
individual receiving no donations, this approach would produce
serious inequities. Moreover, such a dollar limit would signifi-
cantly increase the SSI program cost. In addition to the expanded
SSA staff and resources required in each case to ensure, that the
in-kind income is worth less than $200, the total amount of SSI
payments would increase because many SSI beneficiaries would
no longer be subject to any benefit reduction. ,1 If Congress ex-
panded the exclusion to cover the first $250 of donated income,
6 See, e.g., H.R. 7033, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 14512 (1975) ("A bill ...
to provide that support and maintenance (in cash or kind) furnished to an eligible indi-
vidual by members of his or her immediately [sic] family shall be disregarded (and shall not
serve to reduce his or her supplemental security income benefits) to the extent that it does
not exceed $200 a month."). This bill covers only support and maintenance provided by an
individual's immediate family; a more equitable approach would disregard the source of
the assistance. See also H.R. 8375, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REc. 21685 (1975)
(proposing exclusion of up to $250).
71 1975 Hearings, supra note 4, at 452 (statement of Rep. Edward I. Koch).
71 Individuals whose SSI benefit levels are currently subject to the one-third reduction
because they receive support and maintenance worth less than the specified dollar amount
would receive no support and maintenance if the first $200 were excluded. Thus they
would no longer be subject to the one-third reduction.
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available resources would, in effect, double for some recipients. 72
Aware of these problems, Congress has refused to adopt propos-
als excluding initial amounts of donated income.
3. Reductions in Presumed Value
Proposals to reduce the presumed value of in-kind support
and maintenance from the current one-third to one-fifth of the
applicable benefit level are variations of the current scheme. As
with the one-third rule, all in-kind income worth more than the
presumed value would not count in computing SSI benefits. Un-
like the partial exemption proposals based on a dollar amount, a
reduction in the presumed valuation would present the same dis-
incentives to outside sources of assistance that exist under the cur-
rent scheme. 73  A family's contribution would improve the recip-
ient's standard of living only if the contribution exceeded the frac-
tional reduction. 4 This approach also ignores the problems
caused by wide variations in the value of donated support and
maintenance. The SSI program would remain open to abuse by
recipients whose wealthy contributors can satisfy their every mate-
rial need. Like the partial exemption proposals, reduction in the
presumed value would increase program costs. This proposal
would increase SSI benefits for all those now subject to the one-
third reduction rule and would extend SSI payments to individu-
als who are currently ineligible because their total income-in-
cluding the presumed value of in-kind income-exceeds the
applicable benefit level . 75  The House Ways and Means Commit-
7' The maximum current SSI benefit for an eligible single individual is $208.10 per
month. Under a $250 exclusion, if an individual received full SSI benefits plus in-kind
support with an actual value of $250, his available resources would be more than doubled.
73 Any donation of in-kind support and maintenance to the SSI recipient would trigger
the fractional reduction in benefits, even if the contribution's actual value was less than the
amount of reduction. Where the recipient successfully rebutted this presumed valuation,
donated contributions would reduce his SSI benefit, dollar-for-dollar, until increasing do-
nations equalled the fractional amount. See note 60 and accompanying text supra.
"I A family unable to contribute more than $69.40 (one-third the current benefit level
for a single individual) to an SSI recipient might be able to afford more than $41.64
(one-fifth the benefit level). For such families, reduction in the fractional valuation would
remove the disincentive to aid an SSI recipient.
7' As the presumed value of the in-kind income shrinks, the amount of income attrib-
uted to the individual also decreases. Individuals with in-kind support and maintenance
valued at one-third the applicable benefit level may be ineligible for SSI because their
income level slightly exceeds the current applicable benefit level. Such individuals may
become eligible if the reduction in the presumed value of their in-kind income pulls their
income level below the benefit level. Because their entitlements would not exceed the re-




tee rejected a. proposal to reduce the presumed value of in-kind
support and maintenance because "it would not completely solve
the problems which arise, and entailed considerable cost." 76
Another proposed modification would reimburse recipients
for all partial payments they make towards in-kind support and
maintenance, up to the amount of the one-third reduction. 77  Al-
though this proposal would eliminate inequities arising from the
current disregard of partial payments, the reimbursement would
subsidize outside sources of assistance. If the SSA reimbursed
recipients dollar-for-dollar for all partial payments up to the one-
third reduction amount, they would have no incentive to hold
such payments below that amount. Consequently, the federal gov-
ernment could end up paying full SSI benefits to a recipient who
in turn might pass one-third of each payment to his source of
support. Because these proposals would dramatically increase
costs without substantially benefiting recipients, they do not merit
serious legislative consideration.
4. Complete Exemption
A bill currently before Congress would exempt all in-kind
support and maintenance from SSI benefit calculations. 7  This
approach could be easily administered and would eliminate disin-
centives to outside sources of assistance. The proposal, however,
would allow wide disparities in the value of the in-kind income,
yet would not affect the amount of SSI benefits and would not
prevent abuse of the SSI program. Moreover, the proposal might
encourage recipients to disguise cash payments as in-kind income
7c HousE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, SUPPLEMENTAL SECURITY INCOME AMENDMENTS
OF 1976, H.R. REP. No. 1201, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 11.
7 See, e.g., H.R. 165, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REc. 188 (1975). The National
Retired Teachers Association and the American Association of Retired Persons endorsed
this approach. Speaking on behalf of these organizations, John B. Martin, former United
States Commissioner on Aging, stated: "Arbitrary rules to avoid the complexity of indi-
vidualized determination fail to provide the human compassion and understanding which
is necessary to maximize the choice of living arrangements available to SSI recipients."
1975 Hearings, supra note 4, at 265.
71 H.R. 1727, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REc. H 403 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1979) ("A
bill to amend ... the Social Security Act to provide that support and maintenance fur-
nished in kind shall not be counted as income in determining the eligibility of any indi-
vidual for supplemental security income benefits or the amount of such benefits, whether
such individual is living in another person's household or otherwise ...."). Several bills to
exempt all in-kind support and maintenance provided to mentally retarded individuals
living in another person's household have been introduced. See, e.g., H.R. 588, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess., 125 CONG. REc. H.172 (daily ed. Jan. 18, 1979); H.R. 3937, 95th Cong., Ist Sess.,
123 CONG. REc. H.1,394 (daily ed. Feb. 23, 1977).
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in order to take advantage of the full in-kind exemption.. The
proposal would cost more than the current program, since SSI
benefits would increase by the amount of the one-third reduction.
In addition, benefits would be extended to recipients who are now
ineligible because their income, including the value of in-kind
support and maintenance, exceeds the applicable benefit level. SSI
benefits would also increase for those who are able to successfully
disguise cash payments as in-kind income.
E. Recommendations
Most of the problems with the current treatment of in-kind
income can be solved without radically restructuring the SSI pro-
gram. Congress should (1) replace the one-third reduction rule's
irrebuttable presumption with a rebuttable presumption, (2) pro-
vide a statutory basis for the current regulations that extend the
one-third reduction rule, (3) adopt a reduction scheme requiring
fractional valuation for all in-kind support and maintenance, and
(4) narrow the definition of "support and maintenance."
1. Replace the Irrebuttable Presumption With a Rebuttable
Presumption
The statute's one-third reduction rule contains an irrebutta-
ble presumption that the value of the in-kind support and
maintenance income provided to the SSI recipient living in
another person's household is worth one-third of the recipient's
applicable benefit level. 79 Congress could improve the SSI pro-
gram in three respects by making this presumption rebuttable.
First, this modification would remove any doubts about the stat-
ute's constitutionality."' Second, a rebuttable presumption could
simplify the regulations, which now draw complex distinctions be-
tween situations in which the presumed value is rebuttable and
those in which the presumed value is irrebuttable. 81 Removing
the irrebuttable presumption would foster consistent and coherent
regulations. Such a modification would alleviate some of the inhe-
rent inequities of the statute because recipients who receive in-
kind income worth less than the presumed value would be able to
rebut the presumed valuation. Moreover, a rebuttable presump-
19 See note II and accompanying text supra.
80 See notes 55-57 and accompanying text supra.
'I See 20 C.F.R. § 416.1125 (1979) and notes 57-58, 47-48 & 32-35 supra.
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tion would reduce the disparate treatment between persons cov-
ered by the statutory one-third reduction rule and those covered
by the rebuttable one-third reduction. 82
Although a rebuttable presumption would increase program
and administrative costs, the additional expense would be mini-
mal. Since the one-third reduction is based on SSI's low benefits,
the value of in-kind support and maintenance will usually exceed
the one-third reduction.8 3 Consequently, few recipients would
challenge the reduction by seeking actual valuation of their sup-
port and maintenance. Moreover, a challenging recipient would
bear the burden of proving the actual value of his support and
maintenance, thus minimizing additional administrative responsi-
bility.
2. Provide Statutory Support for Current Regulations
Although designed to facilitate administration of the one-
third reduction rule, the current regulations exceed their statu-
tory authority. They extend the one-third rule to situations not
covered by the statute and prevent unearned in-kind support and
maintenance income worth more than the presumed value from
reducing the recipient's benefit.8 4 These regulations would not
82 In addition to differences in the amount of benefit reduction, a further inequity
.ccurs when the SSA uses a rebuttable presumption to value support and maintenance
received by persons exempt from the statutory one-third reduction rule because they are
living in their own households or are receiving only food or shelter. Such individuals have
a choice. If the actual value of their in-kind income exceeds the presumed one-third, they
can choose to do nothing and benefit from income not counted against their benefit level.
But if the actual value of the in-kind income is less than the presumed value, they can
rebut the presumption. If they succeed, their SSI benefits will increase. Because of current
regulations, the statutory irrebuttable presumption thus engenders inequities within the
SSI program. See notes 32-36 & 47-48 supra.
"' The minimum income level guaranteed to an eligible single SSI applicant was "ap-
proximately 73% of the poverty line [income] for a one-person family." The income level
assured an eligible couple was "approximately 83% of the poverty threshold for a two-
person family." CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, WELFARE REFORM: ISSUES, OBJECTIVES AND
APPROACHES 11 (1977). Even after inclusion of state supplements, the income levels often
remain below the Bureau of Labor Statistics' estimated poverty levels. See 1975 Hearings,
supra note 4, at 641 (statement of Janet Bruin, Community Organization Director,
Philadelphia Corp. for Aging). In many cases, the benefit levels even before application of
the one-third reduction do not cover the cost of basic necessities. See id. at 153-54 (state-
ment of Rep. Elizabeth Holtzman); id. at 167 (report of the SSI Monitoring Subcomm.,
Citizens' Committee of Aging); id. at 228-29 (statement of William R. Hutton, executive
director, National Council of Senior Citizens); id. at 301 (statement of Joseph A. D'Elia,
commissioner, Nassau County Dep't of Social Services).
84 See notes 33-35 and 47-50 and accompanying text supra. The Senate Finance Com-
mittee's staff report on the SSI program noted that the SSA reacted to problems caused by
the one-third reduction rule
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withstand judicial review. 85  Although a court challenge is un-
likely because the regulations benefit most affected SSI recip-
ients,8 6 Congress should provide statutory support f6r the regula-
tions. Such approval would not change the operation of the SSI
program.
3. Require Fractional Valuation of Contributions
The most serious defect of the one-third reduction rule is
that it discourages contributions from an SSI recipient's family
and friends. Under the current scheme, such contributions may
reduce a recipient's benefits, and occasionally, reduce his net in-
come. 87 Congress should eliminate this disincentive by requiring
the SSA to value all in-kind donations at a specified fraction of
not by seeking legislative change, but through administrative action contrary to
the law. . .. [Tihe Social Security Administration has transformed the one-third
reduction rule from an alternative to be used in certain specified cases meeting
statutory criteria to a maximum limit on the value of in-kind contributions. The
statute says all income is to be considered except where an individual is living in
someone else's household and receiving income in kind from him; the Social
Security Administration's policy says instead that regardless of whether an indi-
vidual is living in someone else's household, income in the form of support and
maintenance in kind shall never be considered to be worth more than one-third
of the basic payment level. ... While this rule may be of some help, administra-
tively, there is no statutory basis for it.
STAFF REPORT, supra note 3, at 73 (emphasis added).
8'5 The Supreme Court enunciated the appropriate standard of review of regulations in
Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356 (1973):
Where the empowering provision of a statute states simply that the agency may
"make ... such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the
provisions of this Act," we have held that the validity of a regulation promul-
gated thereunder will be sustained so long as it is "reasonably related to the
purposes of the enabling legislation."
Id. at 369 (citing Thorpe v. Housing Auth. of Durham, 393 U.S. 268, 280-81 (1969) (foot-
notes omitted)). The relevant provision of the SSI statute provides: "The Secretary may
make such administrative and other arrangements ... as may be necessary or appropriate
to carry out his function under this subchapter." 42 U.S.C. § 1383b (1976). The regulations
fail to meet the Mourning test. By exempting all in-kind income worth more than the pre-
sumed value, the regulations contravene the statute's purpose of providing a uniform gov-
ernmental minimum income. They also directly conflict with the statute's explicit require-
ment of including all unearned income not falling within a statutory exception.
" In the few cases in which the actual value of in-kind income is less than the amount
of the one-third reduction, the regulations allow the SSI recipient to prove the lower value
and obtain an adjustment in his benefit level. 20 C.F.R §§ 416.1125(c), (d) (1979). Such
claimants have little incentive to attack the regulations. They would have to present the
same evidence as they would if they were rebutting the presumption of value, and, if
successful, they would risk the consequences of removal of the one-third rule's ceiling.
Although the individual's in-kind income may now be less than the one-third reduction,
because of inflation its value may rise above that level in the future.
" See notes 59-60 and accompanying text supra.
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their actual value and deduct this amount from the recipient's ben-
efit level. 88  If a contribution of support and maintenance acti-
vated the one-third reduction rule, the SSI recipient could rebut
the rule's presumption of value by showing that the fractional
value of the contribution less any payment made toward it was
less than its presumed value.89 If he succeeded, the SSA would
deduct a fraction of its net value from his benefit level. In other
situations where the actual value of donated support and mainte-
nance is subtracted dollar-for-dollar from a recipient's benefit
level, 90 Congress should require the SSA to deduct a fraction of
the value instead. If such donations increased, the SSA would
further reduce the individual's benefit level until the fractional
value exceeded the presumed value under the one-third reduction
rule. The SSA would then disregard further contributions. 91
This fractional valuation approach would encourage con-
tributions from families and friends. A contribution to an SSI
beneficiary would immediately increase his standard of living, be-
cause the SSA would reduce his benefits by only a fraction of the
contribution. This approach would also recognize the recipient's
partial payments toward his support and maintenance. The SSA
would subtract the payment from the actual value of the support
and maintenance and then compute the fractional value of the
remainder. To the extent that such payments reduced the frac-
tional value below the presumed value and the recipient chose to
rebut the presumption, his SSI benefits would increase. The SSA
would, in effect, reimburse him for a fraction of that payment.
Successful implementation would reduce inequities of the current
approach and provide meaningful assistance to individuals mak-
ing partial payments.
This approach, like others discussed above, would signifi-
cantly increase program costs. Although the SSA now assesses the
actual value of in-kind support and maintenance in certain cases,
the administrative burden would increase if more beneficiaries
could rebut the presumption of value. 92 Benefit costs would also
8 This approach is similar to the SSI program's work incentive provision, which disre-
gards the first $20 of earned or unearned income each month. 42 U.S.C. § 1382a(b)(2)(A)
(1976).
89 See 20 G.F.R. § 416.1125(d) (1979).
90 See id. § 416.1125(d) (presumption rebutted upon showing market value of contribu-
tion) and note 34 and accompanying text supra.
91 See 20 C.F.R. § 416.1125(b)(1) (1979).
02 The magnitude of this increased burden is difficult to predict. Because of extremely
low benefit levels, many SSI beneficiaries could not rebut the presumed one-third valuation
19801
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increase, but additional outside contributions encouraged by the
fractional valuation approach would partially offset such costs a
Without empirical, stdy,,, however, the overall cost increase is un-
predictable. 94
4. Narrow the Definition of "Support and Maintenance".
The SSA should restore its pre-1978 -definition of support
and maintenance as "room and board and ... other incidentals,
such as clothing, necessary to an individual's sustenance." 9 5  Under
this definition, an SSI beneficiary's receipt of medical supplies
from the person with whom he lives would not reduce his benefit
beyond the one-third reduction. 96 The phrase "necessary to an
individual's sustenance" should provide some limit on the quantity
of food or clothing that constitutes support and maintenance; 97
by narrowly interpreting "necessary," the SSA could prevent indi-
viduals who receive extensive support and maintenance from
abusing the one-third reduction rule. This approach would re-
quire careful implementation to minimize intrusive inquiries about
the nature of donations to the SSI recipient. Its potential for
eliminating non-needy recipients from the SSI rolls, however,
makes it one of the most cost-effective measures available.
CONCLUSION
After six years of operating the SSI program, the SSA has
attempted to solve the major administrative problems presented
even when using fractional valuation of the actual in-kind income. The magnitude of these
effects also depends on the fraction chosen; more beneficiaries would be able to rebut the
presumed one-third value if the in-kind contributions were valued at 50% of actual value
than if they were valued at 75% of actual value. A sliding fractional rate, similar to a
progressive income tax rate, may be desirable. Small contributions could be valued at a
lower fraction than larger contributions. This approach would encourage a greater number
of small contributions without increasing the total cost of the program as much as would a
uniform low rate for all contributions.
93 If Congress adopted a 50% fractional valuation scheme, a $50 contribution to an
individual who currently receives no support and maintenance would produce a $25 net
increase in his standard of living and a corresponding $25 decrease in federal expendi-
tures. If such a scheme encourages additional contributions to individuals not otherwise
subject to the one-third reduction rule, federal expenditures might decrease.
'4 No empirical data exists to indicate the number of individuals whom this proposal
would affect because many such persons are now subject to the one-third reduction rule or
receive no SSI benefits at all. In either case, since the actual value of total support and
maintenance received is unascertainable, accurate assessment of the probable effects of
fractional valuation is impossible.
40 Fed. Reg. 48,937, 48,938 (1975).
9 See note 28 and accompanying text supra.
91 See note 26 and accompanying text supra.
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by the one-third reduction rule. The rule itself, however, is
flawed. The rule discourages outsiders from aiding SSI recipients,
penalizes some -recipients for their living arrangements, and allows
individuals whose benefactors provide them with high standards
of living to misuse the SSI program. In addition, the irrebuttable
presumption employed by the rule may not pass constitutional
muster. Although legislators have proposed major changes to cor-
rect these problems, radical restructuring of the program is un-
necessary.
By replacing the rule's irrebuttable presumption with a re-
buttable presumption, Congress can remove any constitutional de-
fects and provide the program with needed flexibility. Such a
modification would eliminate the penalty to recipients whose ac-
tual in-kind income is less than the one-third reduction. Congress
should also provide statutory support for the present regulations'
extension of the one-third reduction to remove any doubt con-
cerning the legality of the SSA's eligibility determinations. To en-
courage contributions from families and friends, Congress should
require fractional valuation of donated support and maintenance.
This approach would require the SSA to recognize the value of a
recipient's partial payments toward his support and maintenance.
Finally, the SSA should tighten the definition of support and
maintenance to minimize" abuse of the SSI program. Although
these modifications would increase the administration costs of the
SSI program, they would significantly improve the operation of
the one-third, reduction rule.
Andrew Goodell
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